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GENERAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR
RESILIENCE AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN
LEGAL SYSTEMS - WITH APPLICATIONS TO
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION'
J.B. Ruhl"
As climate change begins to disrupt the settled expectations of humans,
demands on the legal system will be intense and long term. Is the law
up to the task? If it is, it will be at least in part because the legal system
proves to be resilient and adaptive. This Article therefore explores how
to think about designing legal instruments and institutions now with
confidence they will be resilient and adaptive to looming problems as
massive, variable, and long term in scale as climate change. Drawing
from the body of resilience theory forged in natural and social sciences,
this Article is the first to synthesize resilience theory in a framework
relevant to lawyers and explore the general design principles it suggests
for legal systems. The Article opens by examining resilience-what it is
and how to design for it in legal systems. It explores the normative
dimensions of resilience and makes important distinctions between
resilience of legal systems, resilience of laws they produce, and
resilience of the other social and natural systems law addresses.
Similarly, this Article examines the theoretical context and design
principles for adaptive capacity, focusing on adaptive management
theory as an example for legal design. Fusing these two concepts, this
Article suggests applications of these general principles to the challenge
of designing law for responding to climate change, arguing that climate
change adaptation law should draw from theories of adaptive
management, dynamic federalism, new governance, and
transgovernmental networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change soon will begin to disrupt the settled
expectations of humans. Rising sea levels, persistent drought where
water has been abundant, longer growing seasons in some areas and
invasive species elsewhere-the list of anticipated changes that will
play out over the landscape for decades is long, and many inevitably
will give rise to the need to formulate new policies and resolve new
kinds of disputes.' Demands on the legal system will be intense and
long term, but is the law up to the task? If it is, it will be at least in
part because the legal system proves to be resilient and adaptive.
These two properties-resilience and adaptive capacity-have
become central themes for researchers studying a wide array of
ecological, social-ecological, and social systems under the banner of
resilience theory.2 More broadly, they are important focal points of
the science of complex adaptive systems as it has been applied in
natural and social sciences.3 Legal scholars recently have begun to
consider how these properties and the research from other disciplines
might inform the design of laws for discrete legal application,' but no
1. For summaries of the legal and policy issues likely to come with climate change,
including reviews and syntheses of science and law literature on the topic, see generally
Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is Dead" - Long Live Transformation: Five Principles
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 9 (2010); Robert L.
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An
Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REv. 833 (2009); J.B. Ruhl,
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40
ENVTL. L. 363 (2010).
2. See, e.g., PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS passim (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
3. See JOHN H. MILLER & SCoyr E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9-10, 27-31, 139-40,
236-37 (2007) (using the term "robustness" in the same manner as resilience).
4. See generally Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the Face of
Uncertainty: Resilience Theory and the Columbia River Treaty, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES &
1374 [Vol. 89
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legal scholar has undertaken a broad theoretical treatment applying
resilience theory to legal systems.
Drawing from the emerging research and scholarship on
resilience theory, this Article is the first to synthesize resilience
theory in a framework relevant to lawyers and explore general design
principles for resilience and adaptive capacity in legal systems. Part I
examines resilience-what it is and how to design for it in legal
systems. It also addresses the normative dimensions of resilience
theory and makes important* distinctions between resilience of legal
systems, resilience of laws they produce, and resilience of the other
social and natural systems law addresses. Part II provides the
theoretical context and design principles for adaptive capacity,
focusing on adaptive management theory as an example for legal
design. Part III suggests applications of these general principles to the
challenge of designing law for responding to climate change; it argues
that climate change adaptation law should draw from theories of
adaptive management, dynamic federalism, new governance, and
transgovernmental networks.
I. RESILIENCE
Who doesn't want to be resilient? The ability to bounce back
from illness or other setbacks is admirable in people, but what does it
mean for a social system to be resilient? Even more, how can we
design a social system to be resilient? To probe those questions for
purposes of legal design, the following subparts outline the
foundational principles of resilience theory and apply them to the
legal system context.
A. Defining System Resilience
Although there are numerous variations, a good working
definition of resilience as used in natural and social sciences is "the
capacity of a system to experience shocks while retaining essentially
ENVrL. L. 229 (2010) (applying resilience theory to the management of multijurisdictional
watersheds); Pierre de Vries, The Resilience Principles: A Framework for New ICT
Governance, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 137 (2011) (applying resilience theory
to the telecommunications industry); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is
It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005) (recommending the use of adaptive
capacity theory in environmental regulation). One of the earliest uses of resilience theory
in a legal context was by a philosopher studying the contrasts between the Platonic
emphasis on stability and modernity's emphasis on dynamism. See Alicia Juarrero-Roqud,
Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward an Evolutionary Model of Justice, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1745 passim (1991).
1375
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the same function, structure, feedbacks, and therefore identity."' One
hallmark of system resilience thus is the capacity to maintain a high
level of consistency of behavioral structure in the face of a dynamic
environment of change. In 1973 theoretical ecologist C.S. Holling
introduced the idea that natural and social systems exhibiting this
capacity could be described as resilient.6 His model, as refined and
applied over time,' seeks to explain how such systems tolerate
disturbance without changing their basic structural identity.'
Resilience theory has coalesced around several key features of
Holling's model. First, one feature of resilience is recovery-the time
required for a system to return to an equilibrium or steady state
following a disturbance.9 Holling refers to this type of resilience as
engineering resilience in order to convey that it draws on reliability,
efficiency, quality control, and similar strategies to pursue a single
objective-return to the equilibrium state. 0
Engineering resilience is distinct from ecological resilience."
Ecological resilience is measured by the amount or magnitude of
disturbance a system can absorb without having its fundamental
5. Brian Walker et al., A Handful of Heuristics and Some Propositions for
Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (June 2006),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/volll/issl/artl3/ES-2005-1530.pdf.
6. See generally C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN.
REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1 (1973) (outlining the theory).
7. For a comprehensive review of the current theory of system resilience, see C.S.
Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY, supra
note 2, at 25, 25-62. For more concise reviews, see generally Lance H. Gunderson,
Ecological Resilience-In Theory and Application, 31 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 425 (2000), focusing on ecological resilience, and C.S. Holling,
Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Social Systems, 4
ECOSYSTEMS 390 (2001), examining resilience in a variety of natural and social system
contexts. Although the roots of resilience theory are in biological ecology, its influence has
spread throughout natural sciences and, more recently, into the social sciences, though not
with entirely uncritical reception. See generally Fiona Miller et al., Resilience and
Vulnerability: Complementary or Conflicting Concepts?, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (Sept. 2010),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll5/iss3/artl1/ES-2010-3378.pdf (examining criticisms
of resilience theory generally). One source of tension has been how resilience theory
meshes, or does not mesh, with concepts of system vulnerability forged in disciplines
focused on geophysical sciences, political economy, and disaster response. See id.
(exploring ways of harmonizing the two theoretical perspectives).
8. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426.
9. See Isabelle M. C6t6 & Emily S. Darling, Rethinking Ecosystem Resilience in the
Face of Climate Change, 8 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.plosbiology
.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.
1000438&representation=PDF.
10. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426; Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 27-28.
11. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426-27; Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28.
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behavioral structure redefined, 2 a property known as resistance.' In
contrast to engineering resilience, ecological resilience relies on
adjustments to system processes as the means of managing overall
system integrity.14
Engineering resilience, which favors recovery as the design goal,
and ecological resilience, which favors resistance as the design goal,
thus are alike in that both concepts envision a system that has been
pushed off of its equilibrium state by a disturbance." They differ,
however, in terms of the mechanisms and strategies the system uses to
avoid being pushed so far as to be functionally restructured. The
engineering resilience strategy is to devote all system resources to
staying near the equilibrium, the goal being to snap back.'" By
contrast, the ecological resilience strategy accommodates the
possibility of fluctuating within a basin of attraction to equilibrium,
with the goal of avoiding "flips" from one structural state to
another.
Resilience theorists use the heuristic of a ball in a bowl on a table
to capture this distinction." Engineering resilience strategies can be
represented by a ball at the bottom of a tall, narrow bowl, like a vase
with steep sides; ecosystem resilience strategies produce a shallow,
wide bowl, like a saucer with a wide surface. At rest, the balls in both
bowls sit still at the bottom, at equilibrium. As the table is jiggled, the
balls roll around, but they do not roll in the same way. The ball in the
tall, narrow vase stays near the bottom and has quick recovery, while
the ball in the shallow, wide saucer might roll all around and reach far
from the bottom but resist spilling over the rim. The objective of
resilience design is to keep the balls in the bowls, but one can imagine
how different disturbances might produce different results between
the two bowls. A strong wind might knock over the tall vase but not
the shallow saucer. An earthquake might bounce the ball out of the
shallow saucer but not out of the tall vase.
To translate that heuristic back into resilience theory
terminology, the bowls represent the "basin of attraction" for the
balls, 9 which represent the current system behavioral state. The
12. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426-27; Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28.
13. See C6t6 & Darling, supra note 9, at 1.
14. See Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28.
15. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426-27; Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 27.
16. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426.
17. See id. at 427.
18. See id.
19. The terminology described in this paragraph is widely used in resilience and
1377
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bottom of the bowl represents the "attractor" to the equilibrium
state, whereas the form of the basin defines the "latitude" within
which the system state can move before crossing a threshold which, if
breached, makes recovery to the equilibrium state difficult or
impossible. The wider the basin the greater the number of system
states that can be experienced without crossing a threshold. The
"precariousness" of the system defines how close the current state of
the system is to such a threshold. To avoid reaching a high level of
precariousness, engineering resilience strategies rely on strong
attractors and limited latitude, whereas ecological resilience strategies
tolerate weaker attractors in favor of more latitude.20
Another difference between the two strategies has to do with
what resilience theory calls the response diversity of the system,
which is "the diversity of responses to disturbance among species or
actors contributing to the same function in the social-ecological
system."21 Because it opens up options, response diversity enhances
resilience. Response diversity is more likely to be brought about,
however, by ecological resilience strategies because engineering
resilience strategies such as efficiency tend to remove what at the
design stage are apparently wasteful redundancies.22 If new kinds of
problems arise that are not anticipated at the design stage, however,
the assumptions on which the sleek system design was based could
prove overwhelmed. Redundancy in the form of alternative response
options, while not efficient, could prove valuable in such cases.
Engineering resilience and ecosystem resilience thus are two
distinct strategies with potentially large differences in design
orientation and performance outcome. Indeed, they pose "contrasts
so .. . fundamental that they can become alternative paradigms whose
devotees reflect traditions of a discipline or of an attitude more than
of a reality of nature."23 Yet, resilience theory literature often fails to
distinguish between the two properties.24 Before examining how they
differ for legal systems, however, we must first consider when legal
systems display resilience and whether it is always desirable.
complex adaptive systems theory. See generally Brian Walker et al., Resilience,
Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (Dec.
2004), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/print.pdf (providing a summary of
resilience and adaptation theories).
20. See id.
21. See Walker et al., supra note 5. This feature is also known as functional
redundancy. Id.
22. See id.
23. Holing & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28.
24. See C6t6 & Darling, supra note 9, at 1.
1378 [Vol. 89
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B. When Is a Legal System Resilient?
Legal scholars have used terms like resilient and resilience to
describe positive qualities of a legal system.' Although not
articulating any formal theory of resilience, these scholars seem to
mean what ecologists, social scientists, and complex systems
researchers mean-that a resilient legal system enjoys consistency in
overall behavioral structure notwithstanding continuous change of
external and internal conditions. This Article performs the theoretical
exercise of asking how we might map resilience theory principles onto
legal systems in order to better understand when legal systems are
and are not resilient.26
The legal system, like any system, can be defined by its structure
(e.g., constitutional division of powers) and processes (e.g.,
administrative decision procedures). Structure and process thus
define the shape of the basin of attraction (the "bowl") and produce
system behavior in the form of actual decisions of executives,
legislatures, courts, and agencies (e.g., the ruling in a case), which is
where the "ball" is at any time. Different configurations of structure
and processes-different basin shapes-produce different behavioral
outcomes in response to changes in internal and external conditions.
The design configuration also affects how the system withstands
changes of different quality and magnitude over time. Some
configurations could rely on engineering resilience strategies to build
a very efficient set of reliable structural and process components,
while others could use ecological resilience strategies to build
25. The classic example is from KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 513 (1960) ("[A]n adequately resilient legal system can
on occasion, or even almost regularly, absorb the particular trouble and resolve it each
time into a new, usefully guiding, forward-looking felt standard-for-action or even rule-of-
law."); see also Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 71, 104 (1992) (referring to "the flexibility and resilience of the international
legal system"); Juarrero-Roqu6, supra note 4, at 1777 (referring to "the resilience and
adaptability of the United States' legal system"); Janet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing
Water Law, 7 U. DENv. WATER L. REv. 92, 106 (2003) (discussing how to "improve the
resilience of the system" of water law); Oren Perez, Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of
the New Transnational Legal Body, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 48 (2007) (referring to "the
resilience of the global legal system").
26. By "we" I mean the actors in the legal system. References to "actors" and
"design" in resilience theory do not assume a sentient system designer. An actor in an
ecosystem, for example, could be a bird, and the design of an ecosystem could be a result
of purely natural processes. When aimed at social-ecological and social systems, of course,
resilience theory has both the luxury and complication of being applied by humans to
achieve particular normative goals.
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extensive response diversity into the system. These design choices
take place at different scales and for different subsystems. What the
legal community calls environmental law, for example, may be
different in structure and process from criminal law.
Indeed, a resilience theorist surely would interpret some features
of the American legal system as displaying strong versions of
engineering resilience strategies. The Constitution, for example,
displays little tolerance for structural or process change. It was
designed to be hard to alter in design27 and has proven so,a and
efforts to effect change through judicial interpretation, while
persistent, remain controversial. 29 Because of its division of powers,
moreover, opportunities for response diversity are at a premium in
our constitutional system. To be sure, the behavioral state of
constitutional doctrine has moved over the past 200 years, but the
latitude allowed by the Constitution's "bowl" is more that of a vase
than a saucer.o Yet it is resilient. Its highly engineered structure and
27. See U.S. CONST. art. V. For discussions of the Article V amending procedures as
an obstacle to new amendments, see generally RESPONDING TO IMPERFEcTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACriCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995); JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 1-13 (1994);
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis
of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1993); Walter
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process,
97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983); Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971 (1994). For a survey of
procedures for amending various state and national constitutions, see Elai Katz, On
Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 256-64 (1996).
28. There have been over 11,500 proposed amendments to the Constitution, very few
of which have made it through the gauntlet of Article V. See JOHN R. VILE,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND
AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2010, at xx, 344 (3d ed. 2010) (collating proposals by year).
29. Compare Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As
Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258-62 (2005) (favoring "original public
meaning" as normatively superior to and more candid than the doctrine of precedent),
with David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299,
299-301 (2005) (favoring a common law notion of precedent over originalism, asserting
that it provides a workable and more candid framework for full consideration of
"morality, policy, [and] fairness"). See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (criticizing the use of
subjective intent in judicial interpretation); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010) (subscribing to the theory that constitutional interpretation must
change over time).
30. When only one equilibrium state exists for a system, or if all other states are
considered equivalent to disaster, engineering resilience strategies may be the superior
design preference. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 426.
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process design is so enduring that flips to new equilibrium states-the
so-called "constitutional moments"-are quite rare."
By contrast, the American common law system offers an
example of ecological resilience: it is a highly dispersed structure of
courts throughout the nation, all working to craft doctrine under a
loose set of process rules. Response diversity is high, as courts from
different states may reach different doctrinal answers for the same
legal issues. The result is a high capacity for swings in behavior in
response to changing conditions without altering the system's basic
structure and process design. Outcomes can move responsively to
changed conditions, sometimes dramatically so and other times over
long periods of judicial tinkering, without the system's structure and
process design changing.32
For example, under the common law of nuisance, "changed
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so."33 Examples of such change are numerous.
At one time the United States Supreme Court declared: "If there is
any fact which may be supposed to be known by everybody, and
therefore by courts, it is that swamps and stagnant waters are the
cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police power is
never more legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances."3 4
Today, by contrast, it would be unheard of for a court to condemn a
wetland area as a nuisance; indeed, some courts now consider the
draining or filling of a wetland to constitute a nuisance.35 The modern
science of wetland ecology changed public perceptions and
encouraged a 180-degree turn in the application of nuisance law to
wetlands,3 6 but by no means would anyone consider the common law
of nuisance to have been restructured as a system.37
31. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)
(developing the concept of constitutional moments); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress,
Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996)
(examining the concept of constitutional moments).
32. See STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS
OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 169 (1995) (pointing to these attributes of
the common law as evidence of its resilience as a system).
33. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
34. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
35. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
5, 2005) (finding a development that would fill a wetland a public nuisance based on
"evidence as to various effects that the development will have including increasing
nitrogen levels in the pond, both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant
residential septic systems, and the reduced marsh area which actually filters and cleans
runoff").
36. For reviews of this doctrinal shift, see Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl,
1381
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There is evidence, therefore, of resilience of both types in the
American legal system. A few caveats are necessary, however, before
going further to consider how to design law for resilience, for I do not
want to overstate what resilience theory does for law or what
resilience of law means. First, to observe that a legal system is or is
not resilient implies nothing about the system normatively. Resilience
is a quality of a social system, but it does not make the system "good"
or "bad." To be sure, a resilient legal system might depend on or lead
to particular social norms, and thus the presence or absence of
resiliency may tell us something about other normative features of
society. Even though resilience might itself be desirable and
considered normatively a good quality to promote in a legal system,
the presence or absence alone of resilience in a legal system does not
entitle the system to any particular normative status. What Americans
might consider a contemptible legal system-feudalism, for
example-might nonetheless be resilient (as it was for centuries).
Indeed, to the extent that resilience is a desired quality, it may
pose tradeoffs with other normative goals of a legal system. It may be
possible to have too much resilience. If, for example, a legal system is
highly resilient in the engineering sense, but it is producing outcomes
that are no longer normatively acceptable, its resilience is a problem,
not a virtue. In such cases, it may require an extreme external
disturbance or internally initiated system reformation to change the
highly resilient but undesirable regime. The persistence and ultimate
demise of the legal system once supporting American slavery offers
an example.
Extending this reasoning further, it is important to distinguish
between resilience of the legal system and resilience of other natural
and social systems the law is aimed at addressing. Environmental law
scholars, for example, might focus on how law can promote resilience
Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian Property: A Reply to Professor Huffinan,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805, 819-30 (2010); John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to
Wetlands Regulation to Ecological Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 787, 789-96 (2008).
37. As environmental law scholar William Rodgers has suggested,
A striking aspect of nuisance law is its stasis (long term stability), recorded in
familiar modes of judicial expression, common analytical techniques, and custom-
bred indicators of decision.... The key to nuisance law, one might suppose, is
found in the empirical lessons of its application recorded over time, less so in the
articulated rules of decision.
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 113-14 (2d ed. 1994).
[Vol. 891382
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of ecosystems,38 and banking law scholars might focus on how to
make the financial system more resilient,39 but that is not the same as
asking how to design resilience in law. Nor does it necessarily follow
that if we successfully designed the law to be resilient that it will
promote the resilience of anything else we care about.
It is also important to distinguish between the resilience of the
legal system's underlying structure and processes and the stability of
the substantive content of law-that is, the lifespan of particular legal
system behavioral outcomes in the form of decisions by executives,
legislatures, courts, and agencies. Of course, the volatility of law's
substantive content is something many actors in the legal system care
about, but it is a product of the legal system, not a part of its structure
and process. A legal system relying heavily on ecosystem resilience
strategies, for example, is likely to experience high flux in the
substantive legal content it produces. The ball rolls far from
equilibrium in such systems. It may very well be, however, that
controlling for flux is a paramount design goal. There may be many
reasons to prefer stability in the substantive content of the law, and
doing so may drive or constrain choices between engineering and
ecological resilience strategies for legal system structure and process.
These design choices, moreover, operate at multiple scales within
and across the vast domain of the legal system. Resilience theory does
not posit that a system as complex as law is entirely either a vase or a
saucer; rather, it is more a set of landscapes over which we find
engineering and ecological resilience strategies mixing in different
blends to form topographies of various contours depending on where
in the system we look.' Some resilience theorists refer to this
multiscalar complex of topographies as a "panarchy."
For resilience theory, it is critical to understand the scales of
interest and the scale of analysis because one level of a
panarchy may collapse and cascade to lower levels, but the
system as a whole may be maintained.... Resilience is a
property that can exist at any scale in a panarchy. A given level
may not be very resilient, but the larger system may be.4 1
38. See Cosens, supra note 4, passim.
39. See generally Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1683 (2011)
(exploring the effectiveness of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act in achieving its
goals in practice).
40. See Garry Peterson, Craig R. Allen & C.S. Holling, Ecological Resilience,
Biodiversity, and Scale, 1 ECOSYsTEMS 6, 10-11 (1998).
41. Craig R. Allen & C.S. Holling, Novelty, Adaptive Capacity, and Resilience,
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Environmental law, for example, has many facets, not all of
which use the same blend of resilience strategies. Environmental law
in turn is nestled with many other fields of regulation in the larger-
scale system of administrative law, each with its own resilience
landscape. Similarly, administrative law operates alongside the
common law, which has different resilience properties. The legal
system, therefore, has many potential equilibrium states at many
different scales, each with its own set of resilience attributes. One
component of the larger system-to use an all-too-real example, our
financial law system-may fail, but the legal system as a whole may
continue to prove resilient.
It follows from all of the foregoing that the possibility of flips
from one equilibrium state to another are not necessarily undesirable
in legal (or other) systems. If the resilience of natural ecosystems or
the stability of legal decisions is our priority, it might be law's
structure and process that have to shift to a new equilibrium state
when change threatens those values.42 For example, if one were to
trace the history of what might be called the environmental law
system, an unmistakable flip occurred in the 1970s as statutory
regimes supplanted common law regimes as the dominant system
structure.43 This was in many ways a planned flip to a new equilibrium
state, a process known in resilience theory as transformability." One
ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (Sept. 2010), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll5/iss3/art24/ES-
2010-3720.pdf; see also Walker et al., supra note 19 ("[B]ecause of cross-scale interactions,
the resilience of a system at a particular focal scale will depend on the influences from
states and dynamics at scales above and below. For example, external oppressive politics,
invasions, market shifts, or global climate change can trigger local surprises and regime
shifts.").
42. Most of the focus of legal scholars interested in social-ecological systems, for
example, is on how law can facilitate making the social-ecological system resilient. See
Cosens, supra note 4, at 255-65 (case study of Columbia River system); Glicksman, supra
note 1, at 865-91 (federal public lands). This is different from, but not necessarily
unrelated to, the question of how to make law resilient as a system. Cosens notes, for
example, that "facilitation of resilience in social-ecological systems will also require
changes in substantive environmental and natural resources laws by incorporating a bias
for decision making that enhances resilience rather than optimization." Cosens, supra note
4, at 256. The question I am examining is how to make the changed legal systems
themselves resilient.
43. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW passim
(2004). This is by no means to suggest the common law has been displaced, or even that it
has not come back a bit as an important institution in environmental law. See generally
Symposium, Common Law Environmental Protection, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575
(2008) (discussing the role of common law within environmental law).
44. Walker et al., supra note 19 ("[Transformability is [t]he capacity to create a
fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, or social (including political)
conditions make the existing system untenable ... [by] creating new stability
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of the facets of resilience theory thus focuses on how to manage
systems that have multiple equilibrium states and how to flip between
them under certain conditions.45 Indeed, I propose in Part III a
transformative flip in the administrative law system to allow it to
respond more resiliently to climate change.
Finally, "[m]easuring resilience is fraught with difficulties."
There is no resilience meter for law or any other social system. If we
form a theory of what resilience means, however, we may be better
equipped to identify and broadly assess changes in resilience over
time, particularly changes intended to implement our own normative
goals. Thus, it is useful to move on to the question of how to design
for resilience.
C. Designing for Resilient Legal Systems
Given that we can define resilience and identify its operation in
many social systems including law, an obvious question follows: What
is it that allows these systems to sustain such productive, aggregate
patterns through so much change?4 7 A starting point is to unpack the
engineering/ecology resilience distinction into a more refined
typology of attributes. For example, in their deep examination of
resilience in complex systems, Alderson and Doyle explain that five
key features of a system contribute to the capacity to endure through
surrounding change: "Reliability involves robustness to component
failures. Efficiency is robustness to resource scarcity. Scalability is
robustness to changes to the size and complexity of the system as a
whole. Modularity is robustness to structured component
rearrangements. Evolvability is robustness of lineages to changes on
long time scales."48
Of these five qualities, reliability and efficiency appear most in
keeping with Holling's vision of engineering resilience, while
scalability, modularity, and evolvability match up more closely with
ecological resilience.49 Although it would be ideal to be able to
landscapes.").
45. Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 29.
46. C6t6 & Darling, supra note 9, at 1.
47. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 28.
48. David L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their
Implications for Network-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS,
MAN, & CYBERNETICS 839, 840 (2010).
49. Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28 (describing engineering resilience as
focusing on "maintaining efficiency of function," while ecological resilience "focuses on
maintaining existence of function"); see also Peterson, Allen & Holling, supra note 40, at
11-15 (discussing ecological resilience and scalability).
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maximize all five properties of resilience in a legal system, it is far
more likely that tradeoffs limiting that possibility will be encountered
and force difficult decisions about system design. A system that is
highly efficient in using scarce resources, for example, might have less
response diversity because of the lack of redundancy in important
system components.o A recurrent system design question, therefore,
is which of these properties to favor.
Holling devotes most of his work on resilience theory to
answering that question in the social-ecological system context, with a
decided preference for ecological resilience strategies. He and
Gunderson claim, for example, that "[e]xclusive focus on the first
definition of resilience, engineering resilience, reinforces the
dangerous myth that the variability of natural systems can be
effectively controlled, that the consequences are predictable, and that
sustained maximum production is an attainable and sustainable
goal."" The assumptions of controlled variability and reliable
predictability, if true, would support focusing on strategies like
reliability and efficiency of the system. Under such conditions, the
predictable low-variance behavior of expected changes would make
designing system components and a lean system architecture easier
and less risky. But if those premises are not true, success in using
engineering resilience strategies to design around a small tolerance
for variability means "the system becomes more vulnerable to
external shocks that previously could be absorbed."52
To put it another way, if it is expected that there is little capacity
to predict and control a high variability of changes in internal and
external conditions, engineering resilience strategies pose a higher
risk of catastrophic failure. Under those conditions, system design
should favor ecological resilience strategies.5 3 After all, consider what
scalability, modularity, and evolvability imply. Scalability allows a
system to shift relevant temporal and spatial scales to adjust to
changed conditions; modularity allows the system to shift functions
and relationships between system components to adjust to changed
conditions; and evolvability implies the capacity to keep doing both
over long time periods.54
50. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 48, at 840 (using the example of efficiency and
reliability as possible system tradeoffs).
51. Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28.
52. Id.
53. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 432-33.
54. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 48, at 840.
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Obvious examples of these qualities exist in enduring legal
systems. The American legal system, for example, has scaled up
spatially, integrating new state after state into the system. At any
scale, moreover, our federalism governance model has also allowed
us to configure different combinations of local, state, and federal
governance units to respond to different policy challenges, and to
rearrange the combinations to adjust for changing conditions. The
system has done both for centuries-placing a premium on
evolvability.
This is not to say that engineering resilience is not a useful design
component for legal systems. We may want some foundational
normative principles, such as protection of religious and speech
freedoms, to stick close to equilibrium conditions. Even if we expect
high variability and low predictability of the type of system stresses
that potentially flow from the exercise of free speech, we may value
that normative goal so much that we are not willing to tolerate the
range of outcomes produced under a strong ecological resilience
design. Simply put, some norms are so important that we do not want
the "ball" to be able to stray far from the bottom of the bowl. And,
more broadly, where the ball comes to rest on the spectrum between
extreme engineering and extreme ecological resilience design is by no
means an easy question. For example, a persistent debate in
environmental law has focused on whether to design from fixed
general principles in the mode of engineering resilience or from more
flexible processes in the mode of ecological resilience."s As a general
matter, however, the lesson from resilience theory is that conditions
of high variability and low predictability point in the direction of
ecological resilience strategies as the default design rule.
55. Compare Bruce Pardy, Environmental Assessment and Three Ways Not To Do
Environmental Law, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 139, 153 (2010) ("The proper role for
environmental law is to set generally applicable limits on the degree to which human
activities encroach upon ecosystems.... The permissibility of proposed projects would be
apparent from the application of the general rules, and there would be no justification for
a process of utilitarian, discretionary, case-by-case decision making tightly held by political
officials."), with A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 219 (2004) ("[A]n effective and long-lasting environmental
law cannot be constructed around a series of abstract substantive principles.... The
candidate suite of principles such as advance environmental impact assessment, polluter
pays, precaution, and sustainable development are useful starting points but they can only
serve as guideposts to structure a dynamic, but inevitably ad hoc, decision making
process.") (footnote omitted).
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II. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
System resilience is not uniform across time, space, and
conditions. Rather, "[a] system can have a property that is robust to
one set of perturbations and yet fragile for [a different property]
and/or [perturbation],"6 and thus "a system's ... resilience expands
and contracts."5 Tradeoffs internal to the system are not the only
reason resilience is variable. Components of a system can break down
in ways that undermine one or more properties of resilience, and new
kinds of exogenous conditions can arise for which a system has little
resistance or which pose more substantial barriers to recovery.
Resilience, in other words, must be managed-the system must adapt.
But it must adapt without undermining its own basic behavioral
structure. This Part examines what that means in theory and what it
means for a legal system.
A. Defining System Adaptive Capacity
Any particular combination of resilience strategies faces limits
over time. Thus, a system would benefit from a protocol to identify
imminent changes to components or conditions and to respond by
rebalancing resilience strategies. The idea that a system might sense
threats to system equilibrium and respond by changing resilience
strategies without changing fundamental attributes of the system is
known as the system's adaptive capacity." Going back to the ball and
bowl heuristic,59 adaptive capacity allows the shape of the bowl to
change to alter the balance between engineering and ecological
resilience strategies. A glass bowl has little adaptive capacity; a bowl
made of silly putty has a lot.
Adaptive capacity thus involves
(i) making desirable basins of attraction wider and/or deeper,
and shrinking undesirable basins; (ii) creating new desirable
basins, or eliminating undesirable ones; and (iii) changing the
current state of the system so as to move either deeper into a
desirable basin, or closer to the edge of an undesirable one.'
These overall system changes are accomplished by "mov[ing]
thresholds away from or closer to the current state of the system"
56. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 48, at 840.
57. Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 25, 40.
58. See Gunderson, supra note 7, at 428.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
60. Walker et al., supra note 19.
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(altering latitude), "mov[ing] the current state of the system away
from or closer to the threshold" (altering precariousness), "mak[ing]
the threshold more difficult or easier to reach" (altering resistance),
and "manag[ing] cross-scale interactions to avoid or generate loss of
resilience at the largest and most socially catastrophic scales"
(altering panarchy)."
Resilience does not necessarily require high levels of adaptive
capacity. A system that relies heavily on the engineering type of
resilience attributes, such as reliability and efficiency, may prove
resilient without adaptation precisely because it is highly resistant to
change. By the same token, such a system, because of its rigidity, may
be vulnerable to large-scale disruptions if some internal failure or
external disturbance breaks down the wall of resistance.62 Flexibility
may be a useful guard against this possibility.
Of course, there is a limit to how much a system adapts before it
is no longer the same system. Adaptive capacity implies "system
robustness to changes in resilience,"6 meaning that the goal of
adaptation is to keep the basic identity of the system intact. Indeed,
an overly strong design focus on adaptability can undermine
resilience. Optimizing the system to adapt to a particular set of
disturbances could potentially decrease resilience to unknown
disturbances.' Like resilience strategies, therefore, adaptive capacity
strategies have tradeoffs.
B. When Is a Legal System Adaptive?
As with resilience, legal scholars frequently portray adaptive
capacity as a positive quality in legal systems 65 but seldom expand
upon what adaptive capacity means for law. The idea that adaptive
capacity means managing the mix of resilience properties such as
61. Id.
62. See Holling & Gunderson, supra note 7, at 28.
63. Gunderson, supra note 7, at 435.
64. See Walker et al., supra note 5.
65. See, e.g., H.W. Arthurs, National Traditions in Labor Law Scholarship: The
Canadian Case, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 645, 666 (2002) (referring to the "adaptive
capacity of labor law systems"); Susan L. Brooks & Robert G. Madden, Relationship-
Centered Lawyering: Social Science Theory for Transforming Legal Practice, 78 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 23, 26 (2009) (referring to "environmental changes requiring adaptive legal system
responses"); Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New
Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 798 (1989) (referring to "the
American legal system's adaptive capacity"); Daniel Schramm & Akiva Fishman, Legal
Frameworks for Adaptive Natural Resource Management in a Changing Climate, 22 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 491, 520 (2010) (asserting that countries must "assess the 'adaptive
capacity' of their respective legal systems" to respond to climate change).
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reliability, efficiency, scalability, modularity, and evolvability has not
crept into the legal scholarship on adaptation in legal systems. The
closest example to be found is in the emerging decision process
theory of adaptive management in natural resources law.
Over the past two decades, natural resources policy has
gravitated to a model of nested, ever-changing, complex ecosystems,
the essence of which demands a management policy framework every
bit as dynamic as the ecosystems it seeks to manage.' This rapidly
solidifying framework, known as ecosystem management,' rejects
decision making based on rigid standards and comprehensive rational
planning, relying instead on experimentation using continuous
monitoring, assessment, and recalibration. This decision method
approach has come to be known as adaptive management." Not
surprisingly, its founder is none other than C.S. Holling, who shortly
after forging the theory of resilience laid out the theory of adaptive
management in an influential book, Adaptive Environmental
Assessment and Management.69
Finding conventional environmental assessment and
management methods at odds with the emerging model of ecosystem
dynamics, Holling and his fellow researchers focused on the basic
properties of ecological systems to provide the premises of a new
assessment and management method.o The traditional management
66. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) ("Among the new paradigms
in ecology, none is more revolutionary than the idea that nature is not delicately balanced
in equilibrium, but rather is dynamic, often unpredictable, and perhaps even chaotic."); see
also Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New Ecology and Some Old
Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 49, 49 (1996) (addressing new ecological
emphases on change and dynamism); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology:
Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1995)
(discussing the new empirically supported extensions of Darwin's evolutionary theories).
67. For the seminal works developing ecosystem management theory and policy, see
generally Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America
Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 665 (1996); R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27 (1994). The legal contours of ecosystem management are
comprehensively explored in JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF
BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 311-1035 (2d ed. 2006).
68. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95
MINN. L. REV. 424,424-31 (2010).
69. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling
ed., 1978); see also Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Restoration Under the Northwest Power
Act: Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the term "adaptive management" to
Holling's book).
70. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 69,
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approach of natural resources policy was "to attack environmental
stressors in piecemeal fashion, one at a time," and to parcel decision
making "out among a variety of mission-specific agencies and
resource-specific management regimes." 7' Under a dynamic model of
ecosystems, Holling and his colleagues concluded, management
policy must put a premium on collecting information, establishing
measurements of success, monitoring outcomes, using new
information to adjust existing approaches, and being willing to
change.72
The adaptive management framework thus is more evolutionary
and interdisciplinary, relying on iterative cycles of goal determination,
model building, performance standard setting, outcome monitoring,
and standard recalibration.7 3 As it has been refined over time since
Holling's initial work, the full loop of adaptive management involves
eight key steps: (1) definition of the problem, (2) determination of
goals and objectives for management of ecosystems, (3)
determination of the ecosystem baseline, (4) development of
conceptual models, (5) selection of future restoration actions, (6)
implementation and management actions, (7) monitoring and
ecosystem response, and (8) evaluation of restoration efforts and
proposals for remedial actions.74 The last step, the evaluation process,
is critical, for it "feeds directly into adaptive management by
informing the implementation team and leading to testing of
management hypotheses, new simulations, and proposals for
adjustments in management experiments or development of wholly
new experiments or management strategies."
If one could produce a legal system that operated under this
decision process model, management of resilience properties could be
made an explicit subject of hypotheses, simulations, and adjustments
in policy. It remains to be seen, however, whether federal resource
management agencies can translate the theoretical descriptions of
adaptive management into a regime for building adaptive capacity in
at 25-37.
71. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits
in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1409, 1439 (2008).
72. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note
69, at 1-21.
73. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 68, at 428-31.
74. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER
BASIN, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 332-
35 (2004).
75. Id. at 335.
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natural resources law. As Professor Robert Fischman and I have
summed up agency practice, "Rather than elaborating on the
theoretical framework by providing details for implementation ... ,
agencies adopting adaptive management have gone in the reverse
direction [by] condensing the policy of adaptive management into the
bumper-sticker sized slogan of 'learning while doing.' "76 This has, at
best, resulted in a "lite" version of adaptive management that has had
mixed results in the field and in the courts." But lack of will is not all
to blame-agencies also lack the clear authority and resources to
implement adaptive management at its most effective capacity. As
the next section shows, however, it is in fact a lack of design for
adaptive capacity in law that has hampered the agencies' efforts as
much as anything else.
C. Designing for Adaptive Law
Integrating the principles of resilience theory will require that
agencies commit to manage resilience strategies continuously and
flexibly over time. For example, the clear lesson from resilience
theory is that when variability is high and predictability is low,
ecological resilience strategies (scalability, modularity, and
evolvability) are more likely to prove successful. Reliability and
efficiency strategies, on the other hand, may prove more useful in
cases where variability is low and expectations of future conditions
are reliable over relevant planning horizons. Adaptive capacity is
about enabling the system to move between these modes as regimes
of change shift in variability and predictability-to allow changing the
shape of the system's bowl. So the question for adaptation in law is
how flexible to make the bowl.
For an agency seeking to apply adaptive management, the bowl
is unfortunately rigid. Adaptive management theory is a response to
the model of ecosystems as dynamic systems-as having high
variability and low predictability to change. It is, in essence, a call for
moving to ecological resilience strategies in natural resources
management. The problem is that natural resources management
agencies are locked in an administrative law system that places a
premium on engineering resilience strategies and shows no signs of
being flexible in that regard. The system's fixation on predecisional
environmental assessment, cost-benefit analysis, records of decisions,
76. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 68, at 431.
77. See id. at 441-70.
78. See id. at 480-83.
1392 [Vol. 89
HeinOnline  -- 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1392 2010-2011
2011] RESILIENCE AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
and judicial review litigation has pushed the system toward a "front-
end" focus on reliability and efficiency that has made adaptive
management exceptionally difficult to implement." Consequently, it
will be difficult for natural resource agencies, particularly in an era of
climate change, to engage in even a "lite" version of "learning while
doing" if they lack the authority and capacity to build the
infrastructure necessary to implement the full scope of adaptive
management. Moreover, ecosystems are not the only systems in law's
management domain that exhibit high variability and low
predictability. The relatively low adaptive capacity of administrative
law is likely to stifle efforts in other fields of law to move toward
ecological resilience strategies when variability is on the rise and
prediction is unreliable. Part III examines this problem in the context
of climate change.
III. ENVISIONING RESILIENT AND ADAPTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION LAW
If high variability and low predictability are the design challenge
for resilience and adaptive capacity in legal systems, then climate
change will present an unprecedented set of challenges. Climate
change will cause numerous natural and social systems to depart from
settled patterns and ranges of variability, and thus to behave in ways
beyond the control or prediction of many legal instruments and
institutions. Climate change adaptation law design will thus need to
lean heavily on ecological resilience strategies and to tolerate high
levels of adaptive capacity.
For the first proposition-that climate change will violate known
variability of natural and social systems in unpredictable ways-
consider how natural resource managers view the likely effects.' As
noted above, resource management has evolved well past conceptions
of nature as static and "balanced," as the trend over the past half-
century has been to focus more on the complex flux qualities of
ecosystems and to place less emphasis on conceptions of stasis and
natural stability."1 Nevertheless, even the "dynamic equilibrium"
model that is now firmly in place in ecology is based on the
79. For an extended discussion of this thesis and literature supporting it, see generally
J.B. Ruh], Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 21 (2005), which explores impediments to adaptive management posed by the
administrative law system.
80. For an extended discussion of this proposition, on which the short summary here
is based, see Ruhl, supra note 1, at 392-97.
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
1393
HeinOnline  -- 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1393 2010-2011
1394 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
assumption of "stationarity," which is "the idea that natural systems
fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability."' Although
ecologists understand that the envelope can be stretched by natural
and anthropogenic events, "justifiably or not, they generally have
considered natural change and variability to be sufficiently small to
allow stationarity-based design."" Thus, many natural resource
conservation programs to this day depend heavily on the strategy of
setting aside habitat reserves in order to preserve the status quo.M
Even newer, more flexible conservation orientations, such as
ecosystem-based management, depend strongly on the stationarity
premise and its appeal to "natural" and "native" models of ecosystem
dynamics."
But the stationarity premise is on thin ice in the era of climate
change. Ecologists now warn of the no-analog future-ecological
variability unprecedented in the history of ecology, riddled with
nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously unknown
emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change." The
82. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319
SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008).
83. Id.
84. See generally Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets
Dynamic World, 32 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 175 (2010) (reviewing this quality of traditional
conservation programs).
85. See generally Grumbine, supra note 67, at 27 (advocating management of
ecosystems for their "native" properties); Bruce Pardy, Ecosystem Management in
Question: A Reply to Ruhl, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (2005) (proposing
management of ecosystems for "natural" conditions). For arguments against retaining
these conceptions of "nature" as the policy driver in environmental law, see generally J.B.
Ruhl, The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management: A Response to
Pardy, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 315 (2005), and J.B. Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on
Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening the Questions, 24 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 25 (2007), both of which argue for ecosystem management.
86. See generally Peter Cox & David Stephenson, A Changing Climate for Prediction,
317 SCIENCE 207, 207 (2007) (explaining why current climate change models are
unreliable); Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species
Distribution Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY &
CONSERVATION 2255 (2009) (explaining difficulties in predicting future species
distributions); Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007)
(discussing the "no-analog" problem of climate change); Douglas Fox, When Worlds
Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.-Mar. 2007, at 28 (same). The scientific literature exploring
these complex dynamics and exposing our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as
temperature rises is legion. See generally U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THRESHOLDS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS (2009),
available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap4-2/sap4-2-final-report-all.pdf
(examining numerous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in
climate change dynamics); Almut Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the Planet?, 326
SCIENCE 672 (2009) (examining the feedback effects between conventional air pollution
control and climate change mitigation, concluding that complex positive and negative
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"envelope" of variability will not merely grow in size-it will change
in basic structure, and no analog exists for predicting its new ground
rules.' These shifts in ecological systems, along with their impacts on
social systems, have the potential for massive swings not only in the
quality of the risks humans face, but also in their magnitude and
manifestations."
The question, therefore, is how far we can stretch from the
current behavioral states of different natural and social systems, and
of the legal system in particular, before resilience fails and the system
flips into a vastly different future. The lesson we should take from
resilience theory in such cases is to move away from engineering
resilience strategies and toward ecological resilience strategies and to
build adaptive capacity into the system. Indeed, I previously have
outlined several principles for climate change adaptation law that
now strike me as resonating in this resilience theory theme. I outline
feedback links exist and that, on balance, the evidence and models suggest that "air
pollution control will accelerate warming in the coming decades"); Gordon B. Bonan,
Forests and Climate Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320
SCIENCE 1444 (2008) (explaining the complex and nonlinear forest-climate interactions); I.
Eisenman & J.S. Wettlaufer, Nonlinear Threshold Behavior During the Loss of Arctic Sea
Ice, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 28 (2009) (describing the nonlinear "tipping points" in
the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet & Albert Galy, Himalaya-Carbon
Sink or Source?, 320 SCIENCE 1727 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of the sinks and
sources of the carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance,
Carbon, and Climate, 321 SCIENCE 652 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecological
sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics).
87. For more extensive examinations of the reasons for, and policy consequences of,
the erosion of the stationarity premise, see Craig, supra note 1, at 31-39; Glicksman, supra
note 1, at 851-56; Ruhl, supra note 1, at 392-97.
88. Carolyn Kousky and Roger Cooke of Resources for the Future describe this
"unholy trinity" of fat tails, tail dependence, and micro-correlations:
These are distinct aspects of loss distributions, such as damages from a disaster or
insurance claims. With fat-tailed losses, the probability declines slowly, relative to
the severity of the loss. Tail dependence is the propensity of dependence to
concentrate in the tails, such that severe losses are more likely to happen together.
Micro-correlations are negligible correlations between risks which may be
individually harmless, but very dangerous when aggregated. These three
phenomena-types of catastrophic and dependent risks-undermine traditional
approaches to risk management.
Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails, Tail Dependence, and
Micro-Correlations 1 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-36-REV, 2009),
available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-09-36-REV.pdf; see also Carolyn
Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, Climate Change and Risk Management: Challenges for
Insurance, Adaptation, and Loss Estimation 6 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No.
09-03-REV, 2009), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-03-
REV.pdf (applying these concepts specifically to climate change adaptation).
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each principle here briefly" and then tie them into what has been
learned from resilience theory.
First, legal systems most likely to be stressed by climate change,
such as environmental law and water law, must be unshackled from
comprehensive rational planning and other "front-end" decision
process methods such as predecisional environmental assessment and
cost-benefit analysis.' These methods depend too heavily on
assumptions of stationarity and predictability to respond effectively to
the realities of climate change. Recognizing these limitations, legal
scholars already have begun to question the efficacy of using these
methods in climate change adaptation decisions.9' The critical
component of the alternative approach is to deemphasize the front-
end focus, which assumes all effects can be predicted and assessed
before the decision, and introduce formal follow-up mechanisms
demanding that the decision maker integrate new information into an
ongoing decision adjustment process.' Professor Daniel Farber offers
an example in the dynamic, learning-oriented decision process he
calls "climate impact assessments."93 More broadly, and not
surprisingly, the trend in climate change scholarship is increasingly
calling for empowering adaptive management in practice to live up to
its theory.94
89. For a more thorough discussion of these principles, see Ruhl, supra note 1, at 416-
31.
90. See id. at 416-23.
91. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Impact
Assessments: Learning from NEPA's Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,605
(2009) (environmental impact assessment); Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change
and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing
Nothing, 52 LoY. L. REV. 1127 (2006) (cost-benefit analysis); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate
Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 555 (2004) (cost-benefit analysis).
92. Ruhl, supra note 1, at 420.
93. See Farber, supra note 91, at 10,607-14; see also Caleb W. Christopher, Success by
a Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in Addressing Climate
Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 592 (2008) (proposing adaptive approaches for
environmental impact assessment in the climate change context). To be sure, there
remains considerable value in retaining a front-end component of environmental impact
assessments to anticipate climate change impacts, particularly to the extent doing so helps
to increase public awareness and internalize consideration of climate change impacts in
federal agencies and state, local, and private actors. See Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs,
Climate Change, and Corporate Responsibility: The Contribution of Local Government, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2008).
94. See Carl Bruch, The End of Equilibrium, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 30, 32-33
("Incorporating adaptive management into laws and institutions can enhance the capacity
of governance systems and ecosystems to adapt to changing climatic conditions, to develop
and deploy new technologies and techniques."); Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting
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Second, a growing number of environmental law scholars have
gravitated to new governance theory, which turns "away from the
familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by
administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-
party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving" governance.95 The
central organizing principles of new governance theory are
stakeholder participation, collaboration among interests, diversity of
and competition between instruments, decentralization of governance
structures, integration of policy domains, flexibility, and an emphasis
on noncoerciveness and adaptation.' Rigidly relying on fixed,
uniform regulatory instruments, such as technology standards and
regulatory prescriptions, forecloses adaptation to the kind of
evolving, complex problems climate change adaptation will present.
Governance institutions will need a broader array of instruments-
ranging from "hard" prescriptive mandates to "soft" incentive- and
information-based tools-to test for leverage over the more tractable
attributes of climate change adaptation problems over time.
Third, although the roles of states and the federal government in
addressing climate adaptation have not yet been established," the
case for local and regional governance in adaptation policy is
Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure,
59 EMORY L.J. 1 passim (2009); Craig, supra note 1, at 65-67 (utilizing the heading "Be
Serious About Using Adaptive Management-and Change Both Natural Resources and
Administrative Laws to Allow for It"); Glicksman, supra note 1, at 868 ("The land
management agencies, in the planning process as well as in other contexts, must rely
heavily on the management technique known as adaptive management.").
95. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471,473 (2004). For
a sweeping overview of new governance theory, see generally Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,
89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). For additional scholarship developing and applying new
governance principles, see generally THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE
NEw GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance,
Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2008); Alana
Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351 (2008);
Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001); Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st
Century Regulatory State, 86 TEx. L. REV. 819 (2008); Michael Waterstone, A New Vision
of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434 (2007); Robert F. Weber, New Governance,
Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models
Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783 (2010).
96. See Lobel, supra note 95, at 371-404.
97. See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues 1
(Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1,468,621, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468621 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
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strengthened by the variations in climate change impacts across the
landscape." On the other hand, it is not as if the federal government
has no stake in climate change adaptation as a matter of national
interest.99 Attempting to resolve this tension to find the just-right
scale of governance for adaptation would be a futile undertaking-
adaptation policy must operate at all scales in an interconnected
network of decision making. Although the emerging theory of
dynamic federalism has not been focused on climate change
adaptation policy, it matches well with the multiscalar qualities of
climate change. Under dynamic federalism, "federal and state
governments function as alternative centers of power and any matter
is presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the state
governments."" The theory thus explicitly calls for overlapping
federal and state (and, through states, local) jurisdictions.'o Scholars
of dynamic federalism reject the "minimal overlap" model in which
there is a "particular allocation of at least primary regulatory
authority between the states and the federal government." 102 Instead,
they use a model "in which multiple levels of government interact in
98. For discussions of climate change adaptation policy at local and regional scales,
see generally Lara Whitely Binder, Preparing for Climate Change in the U.S. Pacific
Northwest, 15 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 183 (2009); Alejandro E.
Camacho, Climate Change and Regulatory Fragmentation in the Great Lakes Basin, 17
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 139 (2008); Colin Crawford, Our Bandit Future? Cities, Shantytowns,
and Climate Change Governance, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211 (2009); John C. Dernbach,
Toward a Climate Change Strategy for Pennsylvania, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 181
(2004); Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 591 (2009).
99. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and
Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825 passim (2008) (focusing on national policy for
marine environment adaptation).
100. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006). For additional scholarship developing
and applying dynamic federalism theory and related principles, see generally David E.
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh,
From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern
Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition,
Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2005); Robert A.
Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006);
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243
(2005) [hereinafter Schapiro, Toward Interactive Federalism].
101. Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and
the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 397, 448 (2008).
102. Engel, supra note 100, at 161.
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the regulatory process."10 3 As a result, dynamic federalism "reject[s]
the traditional static optimization model for an adaptive one.""
Finally, these climate change law prescriptions resonate with the
emerging theory of transgovernmental networks, which scholars have
forged initially in the context of international law.105 Nation-states,
while still the most important actors, have increasingly disaggregated
into component institutions that share roles with nonsovereign
bodies.10 Transgovernmental networks theory emphasizes the
nonhierarchical horizontal and vertical networks that are built among
the officials of those institutions to exchange information, identify
best practices, harmonize approaches, and enforce the overall policy
program.107 A scientist or policymaker in an agency might be a
member of many such semi-autonomous networks addressing
different problems, serving as one link in a set of ties that facilitate
information flow across and between social networks. As many
people in many agencies build these ties, the overlapping structure of
authorities becomes less a mangle and more an organism.' As a
result, the networked agencies are better equipped to fulfill the
feedback function because people in the network, as opposed to
103. Id.
104. Adelman & Engel, supra note 100, at 1798.
105. Transgovernmental networks theory emphasizes the role of "networks of similarly
situated technocrats" who work in many different governance units, and "conceive[s] of
lawmaking as an organic enterprise, harnessing the technical expertise of bureaucrats who
do not possess heady titles but nonetheless intimately understand the practical exigencies
of their particular issue areas." Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to
International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L
L. 125, 182 (2005). For the seminal and still most comprehensive discussion of
transgovernmental networks theory, see generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER (2004). For additional scholarship developing and applying
transgovernmental networks principles, see generally Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento,
Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially) Disaggregated State: Lessons from the
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 479, 484-92
(2008); Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA.
J. INT'L L. 413 (2007); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of International
Administrative Law: Its Content and Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 415, 425-27 (2002); Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001);
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105
MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007); Christopher Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of
Transgovernmentalism: The Case of E.U. -U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 1 (2005).
106. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 105, at 18,22-23.
107. See id. at 19-22.
108. See Nan D. Hunter, "Public-Private" Health Law: Multiple Directions in Public
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 89, 103 (2007).
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entire institutions, can more adeptly transfer information, confer
about trends, identify and raise alerts about unintended consequences
of policy measures, and so on.
So let us compare two models of climate change adaptation law
structure and process against the principles of resilience theory. One
model, what I will call the "business as usual approach," is typified by
the modern administrative state described above. The approach relies
on comprehensive predecisional assessment and planning for its
decision process and deploys a limited suite of centralized
prescriptive instruments, hierarchical federalism, and insular
administrative agencies for its underlying structure. It depends
heavily on predictive capacity, reliable implementation through
agencies, efficiency through division of authorities, and a limited set
of regulatory instrument options. The other model, what I will call the
"resilience approach," relies on the adaptive management decision
process described above and a broad array of policy instruments from
markets to regulations to common law, dynamic multiscalar
federalism, and networked agencies and other actors for its
underlying structure. The business as usual model corresponds fairly
well with engineering resilience strategies, and the proposed model
comes much closer to meeting the principles of ecological resilience
strategies.
Proponents of dynamic federalism, for example, have primarily
focused on its advantages of plurality, dialogue, redundancy,
accountability, and economies of scale.1" The key point relating to
the federalism question in climate change adaptation policy is the
theory's overlapping, flexible distribution of authority between
federal, state, and local agencies. Namely, while it may appear
inefficient to have several agencies at different scales working away
on some mutual climate change adaptation policy problem, the built-
in redundancy of dynamic federalism can provide significant benefits.
First, it gives the overall structure of governance more rather than
less policy space,"o which surely will be needed for climate change
adaptation. Second, having multiple agencies working on a problem
within overlapping scales can also promote synergy between the
agencies and the formation of informal networks."'
109. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 100, at 1808; Schapiro, Toward Interactive
Federalism, supra note 100, at 292-93; Sovacool, supra note 101, at 448-51.
110. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 100, at 1817-18.
111. See id. at 1809-10 (summarizing literature suggesting that overlapping authority
can promote initiative at one governance scale and spark other scales to follow promising
policy innovations).
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In short, while it may not be as efficient as a tightly hierarchical
federalism system in which scales of authority are insular, dynamic
federalism nevertheless builds scalability, modularity, and response
diversity into the system,112 all of which are likely to enhance
resilience for a legal system aimed at responding to climate change.
Similarly, new governance principles build response diversity by
broadening the array of regulatory instruments. Transgovernmental
network principles enhance adaptive capacity to respond with scalar
and modular adjustments to system organization by keeping decision
makers at all scales structurally linked and information flowing
between them.113 And adaptive management, by extending the
decision-making process from solely the front end to a continuous
learning process, promotes adaptive capacity by allowing decision
makers to continue molding the "bowl" of resilience domains.
To be sure, a legal system using this model may appear to be an
inefficient, continuous work in progress, but it would be intentionally
designed for those qualities precisely to respond to the high
variability and low predictability of what it is addressing. It might not
be the legal system model we would design for other purposes,
particularly if variability and predictability of change were reliably
known for particular legal applications. Indeed, it is the only
governance model that offers the United States hope of managing the
impacts of climate change.
That is quite a bold claim, and skeptics may ask, if this model is
so great, why hasn't it been adopted? To some extent it has, as
agencies adopt adaptive management114 and climate change
adaptation policy is being forged at multiple governance scales."' But
there are many constraints on the transformation from the business as
usual engineering resilience model to the proposed ecological
resilience model. For one thing, we are only beginning to see
evidence of the demise of stationarity in ecological systems, so the
prospect of higher variability and lower predictability in natural and
social systems is still very much a contingency in terms of timing and
intensity. Calls for transformation of the legal system to respond to
112. See Cosens, supra note 4, at 239-42.
113. See generally David E. Booher & Judith E. Innes, Governance for Resilience:
CALFED as a Complex Adaptive Network for Resource Management, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y
(Sept. 2010), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll5/iss3/art35/ES-2010-3404.pdf
(pointing to governance structures representing transgovernmental networks, also known
as complex adaptive network governance, as examples of resilience in application).
114. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 68, at 441-70.
115. See Ruhl, supra note 1, passim.
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the perceived no-analog future thus are likely to face resistance from
entrenched interests.u6 In addition, climate change law is just one
subsystem of a vast legal system, many other parts of which rely
successfully on engineering resilience strategies. Why abandon an
approach that has worked well in many applications and offers
reliability and efficiency as its premiums? In short, moving climate
change law in the direction of ecological resilience strategies, while a
move supported by resilience theory, will be no small feat in
application. The bet we have to make now, therefore, is whether
climate change will disrupt our conceptions of variability and
predictability so much as to require a fundamentally different set of
legal structures and processes. I am placing my money on the need to
transform.
CONCLUSION
When climate change brings a new regime of high variability and
low predictability in natural and social systems, the law must be
ready. This Article addresses this issue in the same way resilience
theorists probe other natural and social systems, and it suggests that
mapping resilience theory onto the legal system is a fruitful exercise
both in general and in particular applications such as to prepare law
for climate change. Several important themes come out of doing so.
First, the dichotomy between engineering resilience and
ecological resilience offers a useful model for sorting out the
properties of and tradeoffs between strategies familiar to legal design:
reliability, efficiency, scalabilty, modularity, and evolvability. Second,
where variability of the change regime facing a legal system is high
and predictability is low, the higher response diversity qualities of
ecological resilience strategies (scalability, modularity, and
evolvability) offer an important resilience enhancement, making them
the default rule for design purposes. Third, whether a legal system is
resilient or not implies nothing about its normative performance, and
vice versa. Resilience is simply a property of the legal system. Fourth,
as a property of the legal system, resilience may face tradeoffs with
normative goals we specify for law, such as promoting the resilience
of natural and social systems, ensuring the stability of law's
substantive content, or protecting highly valued norms such as
freedom of speech from too broad a range in outcomes. Fifth,
116. See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1295 (2009) (discussing weak support for regulations where the targeted harms are
delayed).
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adaptive capacity allows a system to recalibrate the balance between
different resilience strategies but has its tradeoffs as well-too much
capacity to reshape a system may undermine resilience.
This Article by no means has purported to venture much further
than to outline these themes as general design principles for legal
systems. The case study of climate change offers only an opening into
the kind of dialogue that might be possible for legal design using
resilience theory principles. In particular, most accounts of climate
change describe a no-analog future of high variability and low
predictability, suggesting that ecological resilience strategies will
enhance the resilience of the legal system designed to respond to it.
Drawing from theories of adaptive management, new governance,
dynamic federalism, and transgovernmental networks, I offer a
package of structural and process designs geared toward that
approach. It may be difficult to activate that assembly of design
strategies, but climate change may give us little choice but to try if
resilience is a valued feature of the legal system.
Resilience theory may offer legal design nothing in the way of
strategies legal scholars have not already covered. Legal scholars did
not need resilience theory to develop the concepts underlying
dynamic federalism, for example, or the Constitution. Resilience
theory does, however, provide a coherent set of questions and
analytics for stepping back to assess how to coordinate and apply
those strategies to design a legal system that is durable in the face of
change. And whether we like it or not, climate change will present a
rich laboratory for experimentation with the theory of resilience of
legal systems.
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